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The Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) was enacted in 1976 to provide access to 
government information while balancing the interests of privacy and national security.  A 
constant theme in court interpretations has been the extent of FOIA’s national security 
exemptions in preventing disclosure.  These interpretations are based on both FOIA and 
current Presidential Executive Orders addressing the classification of national security 
information.  This paper analyzes the changes between President Bush’s and President 
Obama’s Executive Orders.  Furthermore, this paper examines the relevant case law 
regarding FOIA national security exemptions and possible impacts from the changes in 
Executive Orders.  This paper also makes recommendations on how to better implement 
the policy presented in the Executive Order.  This paper concludes that President 
Obama’s Executive Order, while clearly stating the intended policy of open access and 
addressing prior problems in internal agency procedures, fails to provide adequate 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) into law on 
September 6, 1966, enacting the most comprehensive information access legislation in 
U.S. history, albeit with reluctance.  The lack of enthusiasm shown by President Johnson 
was so great that he refused to participate in a public bill signing, as was the normal 
practice (Johnson, 1966).  Instead Johnson was “dragged kicking and screaming to the 
signing,” as later described by Johnson aide Bill Moyer (Moyer, 2005, p. 2).  While 
Johnson acknowledged the vital role that freedom of information plays in Democracy he 
tempered this support with a longstanding caveat, that national security will always trump 
the public’s right to information (Johnson, 1966).  FOIA was the result of “11 years of 
investigation and deliberation in the House of Representatives and half as many years of 
consideration in the Senate,” yet furthered the establishment of the principles of freedom 
of information first set forth in the Declaration of Independence (Relyea, 2009a, p. 314). 
 In the Statement of the President Upon Signing S. 1160, the Freedom of 
Information Act, Johnson affirmed “the welfare of the Nation or the rights of individuals 
may require that some documents not be made available…As long as threats to peace 
exist…there must be military secrets” (Johnson, 1966, p. 1).  The priority of national 
security has shaped FOIA policies and procedures ever since its inception.  While many 
believed that “the language of the bill will be constructed in such a way as to impair 
government operations,” Johnson did not share their concerns (Johnson, 1966, p. 1).  To 
the contrary, the operations of the U.S. Government would impair the operations of 
FOIA.  In March 2006, the GAO reported that “more than 4 years after September 11, the 
nation still lacks the governmentwide policies and processes that Congress called for to 
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provide a framework for guiding and integrating the myriad of ongoing efforts to 
improve the sharing of terrorism-related information critical to protecting our homeland” 
(U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2006, p. 27).   
 While the Freedom of Information Act was not implemented until 1966, the 
concept of freedom of information has long been an important part of U.S. history and 
policy.  Freedom of information played a role in the development of both the Declaration 
of Independence and the Constitution.  The Declaration cites lack of freedom of 
information as a major point of contention due to the “separation of public records and 
legislative bodies” (Jaeger & Bertot, 2010, p. 371).  The Constitution furthered the 
importance of this policy by including in the first amendment a focus on “information 
access and exchange through freedoms of exchange, assembly, and press (Jaeger & 
Bertot, 2010, p. 371).   At the Constitutional Convention “James Madison and George 
Mason spoke about the importance of publishing all receipts and expenditures of public 
money under the new government” impressing on the Convention the importance that the 
American people know what their government is doing (Relyea, 2009a, 438).  Over one-
hundred years later the U.S. continued to assert the importance of freedom of information 
in post-World War I negotiations, resulting in the spread of this concept to other 
countries and the eventual formalization in the U.S. with FOIA (Jaeger & Bertot, 2010, p. 
371). 
 Currently, freedom of information is a vital issue in the U.S due, in large part, to 
the September 11, 2001 attacks and the post-9/11 reactions.  During this time both the 
government and the American people lacked accurate and current information resulting 
in fear and inability to effectively respond.  Furthermore, the attacks resulted in greater 
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restrictions to government information in the name of protection.  For example, “the 
Bush administration worked to keep as much information as possible related to their 
activities away from public view and other parts of government” (Jaeger & Bertot, 2010, 
p. 372).  A strong policy of freedom of information is no more important than in a time of 
instability and fear.  The public needs accessibility to accurate and complete information 
in order to make informed judgments on actions of the government and to participate in 
democracy.  Without freedom of information the foundations of democracy are unstable.   
 One result of this move away from transparency was a change in command.  
Barack Obama campaigned on an open and transparent government “including promises 
of greatly increased government transparency and the use of new technologies to new 
means of access to government information” (Jaeger & Bertot, 2010, p. 372).  After his 
inauguration President Obama began acting on those promises, issuing two “executive 
orders requiring government agencies to err on the side of openness when considering 
FOIA requests for government records and opening presidential records to the public” 
(Jaeger & Bertot, 2010, p. 372).  Following the enactment of these Executive Orders the 
future of freedom of information in the U.S. appeared to be moving from a policy of 
restriction towards openness.   
 The current state of freedom of information in the U.S., however, is unknown and 
untested particularly regarding the disclosure of national security information.  Court 
rulings on disclosure of national security information through FOIA are based on the 
current Executive Order in effect at the time of trial (Powell v. U.S. Department of 
Justice, 1984, p. 1516).  Generally, Presidents will issue a new Executive Order on the 
classification of national security information, which will set the tone and procedure for 
 4 
freedom of information for their terms in office.  In December 2009, President Obama 
issued Executive Order 13526 which was heralded to shift policy and procedure away 
from secrecy to freedom of information. 
 Executive Order 13526 went into effect in June 2010 and has as yet not been 
applied to a FOIA national security exemption case.  While the White House argued 
“President Obama’s new Order strikes a careful balance between protecting essential 
secrets and ensuring the release of once sensitive information to the public as quickly and 
as fully as possible,” no concrete analysis of its application has been presented (White 
House, 2009, p. 1).  In order to understand the implications of EO 13526 on freedom of 
information, the difference between EO 13526 and President Bush’s Executive Order 
13292 must first be determined, followed by an analysis of important FOIA national 
security exemption case law, and lastly a determination of what changes to these court 
holdings might result from EO 13526.     
 The following is an analysis of the implications of EO 13526 on FOIA within the 
scope of national security exemptions.  This paper will briefly discuss the nine 
exemptions provided in the Freedom of Information Act but the primary objective will be 
to analyze the national security exemptions, Exemptions 1 and 3, discussed later in the 
paper.  First, the current legislation and legislative history pertaining to FOIA national 
security exemptions and information policies will be addressed.  Following this 
explanation EO 13526 and EO 13292 will be compared and the changes between the two 
highlighted.  Next important court statutory interpretations on key FOIA national security 
exemption issues since 1966 will be analyzed.  Lastly, potential changes to court rulings 
due to EO 13526 will be addressed followed by a determination of how these potential 
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changes fit with the overall policy established by EO 13526 and recommendations on 
how to better achieve this policy.   
Chapter 2: The Freedom of Information Act and Amendments 
2.1: Purpose of FOIA 
 FOIA has four primarily purposes illustrated in the legislative history: disclosure 
of government information, repair of prior statutory deficiencies, clarification of access 
procedures, and the balancing of purposes. 
2.1.1 Disclosure of government information: 
 Statutorily, the primary purpose of FOIA was to provide “broad disclosure of 
Government records” (U.S. Department of Justice v. Julian, 1988, p. 8) through 
individually initiated requests for specific government information.  While FOIA was not 
a welcome proposal by many in the executive branch, legislative history points to the 
original intent behind the statute: “it is the purpose of the bill…to establish a general 
philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly 
delineated statutory language” (Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 1965, p. 38).  The 
Senate recognized, as President Johnson later did, the importance of national security.  
Yet the Senate also stressed that the multi-fold interests of the bill should be balanced.  
“It is not necessary to conclude,” the members of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary 
stated, “that to protect one of the interest, the other must, of necessity, either be abrogated 
or substantially subordinated” (Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 1965, p. 38).  Court 
interpretations of FOIA have reinforced the policy illustrated in the legislative history.  
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The U.S. Supreme Court has supported the policy of openness stating that FOIA should 
be implemented with a “strong presumption in favor of disclosure” (U.S. Department of 
State v. Ray, 1991, p. 173).  In addition, the U.S. Court of Appeals stressed that FOIA 
should “not be interpreted in any way as [a] restriction on government disclosure” 
(Charles River Park A, Inc. v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1975, p. 
941).   
2.1.2 Prior statutory deficiencies: 
 FOIA was also established to repair many deficiencies in U.S. law, specifically to 
“eliminate much of the vagueness of the old law” (American Mail Line, Limited v. 
Gulick , 1969, p. 699).  Prior law failed to provide individuals with a standard procedure 
for requesting government information regardless of the agency.  Previous disclosure of 
government information was based on the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), 
which had thus far been used “as an excuse for secrecy” (Floor consideration of S. 1160, 
1965, p. 26821).  The APA was considered a withholding statute as opposed to FOIA, 
which is considered a disclosure statute (Floor consideration of S. 1160, 1965, p. 26822).  
FOIA forced the burden of proof to the government.  While the APA proposed a ‘need to 
know,’ FOIA created a ‘right to know’ standard.  Furthermore, in regards to disclosure, 
the APA was considered “full of loopholes which allow agencies to deny legitimate 
information to the public” (Floor consideration of S. 1160, 1965, p. 26821).  FOIA would 




2.1.3 Clarity of procedures:  
 FOIA was intended to clarify for individuals the procedures to obtain government 
information.  Legislative history indicates that FOIA would provide 1) “workable 
standards for what records should and should not be open to inspection…avoiding 
phrases as ‘good cause,’” 2) removing limitations on who has a right to know information 
based on vague tests of permissibility, and 3) providing citizens a remedy in court for 
denial of disclosure (Floor consideration of S. 1160, 1965, p. 26822).  These statutory 
changes would allow citizens a clear view, prior to requesting disclosure, of both their 
rights to view government information and how to obtain that information.   
2.1.4 Balancing of purposes:   
 The purposes of FOIA are balanced against the sensitive nature of certain 
information or the privacy concerns of U.S. citizens.  Specifically, FOIA is intended “to 
provide a workable formula which balances and protects all interests, yet places emphasis 
on the fullest possible disclosure” (Floor consideration of S. 1160, 1965, p. 26821).  The 
drafters of FOIA attempted to provide this balance through the inclusion of exemptions 
for specific information and amendments to the statute. 
 The Privacy Act of 1974 amended FOIA in order to avoid the invasion of 
citizen’s privacy rights.  The Privacy Act provides that “no agency shall disclose any 
record which is contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any 
person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior 
written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains” (Privacy Act of 1974, 5 
U.S.C.A. § 552a(b)), thereby restricting from disclosure through FOIA any private 
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information that falls into the Privacy Act.  Personal information is also restricted through 
Exemption 6 of FOIA, which applies to personnel and medical files that might pose an 
“unwarranted invasion of personal privacy if disclosed” (Freedom of Information Act, 5 
U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(6)).  The Privacy Act is generally now used in conjunction with FOIA, 
allowing an individual to request information simultaneously through the two statutes to 
maximize disclosure.   
 Concerns about disclosure of sensitive information, such as national security 
information, were addressed by the inclusion of nine exemptions to FOIA, which are 
discussed below.  
2.2 Freedom of Information Act Exemptions 
 While the purpose of FOIA is to provide the fullest possible disclosure, agencies 
may be exempt from disclosure in nine situations.  In evaluating the proper application of 
any of the FOIA exemptions the courts will “balance the public interest in disclosure 
against the interest Congress intended the exemption to protect” (U.S. Department of 
Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 1994, p. 487).  
2.2.1 Information exempted under an Executive Order in the interests of national defense 
or foreign policy and is properly classified (FOIA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(1)) 
 Exemption 1 covers a broad subject area and is managed by various Executive 
Orders.  A frequently applied EO is the recently implemented EO 13526 on Classified 
National Security Information.    Information exempt under this provision must be 
classified properly according to the prevailing EO. 
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2.2.2 Information related to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency 
(FOIA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(2)) 
 Exemption 2 contains two categories of information.  Low 2 covers internal 
matters of a “relatively trivial nature” (Department of Justice, 2009, p. 173).  High 2 
covers “more substantial matters, the disclosure of which would risk circumvention of a 
legal requirement” (Department of Justice, 2009, p. 173).  High 2 may cover national 
security information that demonstrates possible “agency vulnerability assessments and 
evaluations” (Department of Justice, 2004, p. 224).   
2.2.3 Information statutorily exempted that meets certain criteria (FOIA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 
552(b)(3)) 
 Another frequently utilized exemption applies to statutorily exempted 
information.  Currently, statutes must directly specify Exemption 3 in order for the 
exemption to be valid.   
2.2.4 Trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and 
that is privileged or confidential (FOIA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(4)) 
 Exemption 4 covers privileged or confidential information that is either classified 
as a trade secret or commercial or financial information.  This information must have 




2.2.5 Inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters that would not otherwise be 
available by law to another party except in litigation with that specific agency (FOIA, 5 
U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(5)) 
 Information is exempt under Exemption 5 if it meets the “inter-agency or intra-
agency threshold requirement” meaning that the information is “the type intended to be 
covered” (Department of Justice, 2009, p. 359).  The courts have held that this covers 
both pre-decisional and deliberative records (Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 
1973, p. 88).   
2.2.6 Personnel and medical files and other similar information that would constitute an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy if disclosed (FOIA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(6)) 
 Exemption 6 provides protection for privacy rights by prohibiting disclosure of 
records that would result in an invasion of privacy.  This exemption does not cover 
records that contain information about the requester.   
2.2.7 Information compiled for law enforcement purpose that meet specific criteria 
(FOIA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7)) 
 Exemption 7 covers records related to law enforcement purposes that:  
(A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement 
proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an 
impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be 
expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source…(E) would 
disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or 
prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement  
FOIA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7). 
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2.2.8 Information in or relating to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared 
by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision 
of financial institutions (FOIA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(8)) 
 Exemption 8 is generally construed very broadly (Pentagon Federal Credit Union 
v. National Credit Union Association, 1996, p. 11) and is primarily used "to protect the 
security of financial institutions by withholding from the public reports that contain frank 
evaluations of a bank's stability" and "to promote cooperation and communication 
between employees and examiners” (Atkinson v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
1980, p. 4). 
2.2.9 Geological and geophysical information and data (FOIA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(9)) 
 Exemption 9 applies to scientific data generally in the form of maps.  While little 
court interpretation is available regarding Exemption 9 it may be applied more frequently 
in national security cases to protect natural resources from attacks (Little Rivers Inc v. 
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2003).   
Chapter 3: Freedom of Information Act Amending Legislation 
3.1 The Privacy Act of 1974 
 As discussed above, FOIA and the Privacy Act are used in conjunction to provide 
individuals with the fullest possible accessibility to information.  In addition, both the 
Privacy Act of 1974 and FOIA Exemption 6 help protect individuals from invasion of 
privacy and disclosure of personal information.  The Privacy Act does provide ten 
exemptions to the access of personal information and records including: information 
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gathered for civil actions, Central Intelligence Agency records, records complied as the 
function of criminal law enforcement, information classified for national security or 
foreign policy reasons, non-criminal law enforcement purposes, protection of the 
President, used solely as statistical records, investigatory information collection for 
government clearances, appointment or promotion in the Federal service, and promotion 
in the Armed service (The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k), (j), (d)(1)). 
3.2 The Government in the Sunshine Act of 1976 
 In 1976 the Government in the Sunshine Act (“Sunshine Act”) was passed to 
promote open government together with a number of other laws that provided more 
public access to information developed during government meetings.  The Sunshine Act 
provides an extension of FOIA Exemption 3 precluding the disclosure of information that 
is statutorily exempted.  The Sunshine Act specifies particular exemptions including 
information related to national security, “(A) specifically authorized under criteria 
established by an executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense and 
foreign policy and (B) in fact properly classified pursuant to such executive order” 
(Government in the Sunshine Act of 1976, 5 U.S.C.A. §552B(c)(1)).  The other 
exemptions closely follow those in FOIA: information related solely to internal personnel 
rules and practices of an agency, information that is statutorily exempted, trade secrets 
and commercial or privileged or confidential financial information, information involved 
in accusing a person of a crime or formally censuring someone, information which the 
disclosure of would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, investigatory 
records complied for law enforcement purposes (Government in the Sunshine Act of 
1976, 5 U.S.C.A. §552B(c)).  
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3.3 The Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 
1996 
 The E-FOIA amendments placed requirements on agencies to provide electronic 
access to certain FOIA information.  Documents under 552(a)(2), including final 
opinions, policy statements, manuals, and forms, which were created on or after 
November 1, 1996 must be made available electronically (FOIA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 
552(a)(2)(D)).  Generally agencies comply with these provisions by providing access to 
documents through FOIA reading rooms on the agency website. 
3.4 The Intelligence Authorization Act of 2002 
 The major impact of the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2002 was to completely 
prevent an agency from disclosing to non-U.S. government officials through FOIA any 
information from a U.S. intelligence agency.  The pertinent section states:  
(E) An agency, or part of an agency, that is an element of the intelligence 
community (as that term is defined in section 3(4) of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))) shall not make any record available 
under this paragraph to-- "(i) any government entity, other than a State, 
territory, commonwealth, or district of the United States, or any 
subdivision thereof; or "(ii) a representative of a government entity 
described in clause (i). 
The Intelligence Authorization Act of 2002, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(3)(E). 
 The contacted agency may investigate requests that might have been placed for a 
non-U.S. government entity by proxy.  The agencies covered in the Act include those 
defined as part of the intelligence community including the Central Intelligence Agency, 
National Security Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency (National Security Act 
of 1947, 50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).    
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3.5 OPEN Government Act of 2007 
 The Openness Promotes Effectiveness in our National Government (OPEN) Act 
of 2007 made many amendments to FOIA, including numerous procedural changes and 
additions.  Most significant was the establishment of a department within the National 
Archives and Records Administration, the Office of Government Information Services, 
which would review agency compliance with FOIA (OPEN Government Act, 5 U.S.C.A. 
§ 552(h)(1)). 
3.6 OPEN FOIA Act of 2009 
 The OPEN FOIA Act made only one amendment to FOIA, which was an addition 
to Exemption 3.  The addition included the requirement that all statutes, enacted after the 
OPEN FOIA Act, must specifically cite FOIA Exemption 3 in order for the exemption to 
apply (OPEN FOIA Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(3)(B)).  This amendment removed any 
possibility of the statutory applicability later being inferred by either an agency or the 
court system.  
Chapter 4: Freedom of Information Act Procedures 
4.1 Definitions 
4.1.1 Agency 
 FOIA requests may be made to an “executive office, military departments, 
Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in 
the executive branch of the Government (including the Executive Office of the President, 
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or any independent regulatory agency” (FOIA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(f)(1)).  FOIA requests 
may not be made of Congress or the federal courts.   
4.1.2 Record  
 The term record may often be used interchangeably with documents or 
information.  FOIA does not specifically define what a record is, merely stating that a 
record includes “any information that would be an agency record subject to the 
requirements of this section when maintained by an agency in any format, including an 
electronic format” and “maintained for an agency by an entity under Government 
contract, for the purposes of records management” (FOIA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(f)(2)). The 
courts have furthered this explanation by defining agency records as documents which an 
agency “must first either create or obtain” and “must be under agency control at the time 
of the FOIA request” (Forsham v. Harris, 1990, p. 170).  Records that are created or 
obtained by the agency after receipt of the FOIA request but prior to the search for 
records are considered to be in agency control at the time of the request (FOIA 
Regulations, 28 CFR 16.4(a)). 
 More specifically records are “the product of data compilations” including 
“books, papers, maps, photographs, machine-readable materials” (Department of 
Defense, 2010, p. 3).  This definition includes both physical and electronic formats as 
long as it was “created or obtained by an agency of the U.S. government under Federal 
law in connection with the transaction of public business and in agency possession and 
control at the time the FOIA request is made” (Department of Defense, 2010, p. 3).  
 16 
4.2 Filing a Freedom of Information Act request 
 Each agency has a specific office dedicated to processing FOIA requests where 
the initial written requests should be submitted.  The initial request must be “1. clearly 
marked “Freedom of Information Act Request;" 2. identify the records requested… 3. 
state that the records are requested under the Freedom of Information Act; and 4. include 
a daytime telephone number and/or email address in case additional information is 
needed before answering requests” (U.S. Copyright Office, 2010).  The records identified 
should be as specific as possible including the subject matter, dates, origin, and the names 
of the originating persons or offices (U.S. Copyright Office, 2010).  The agency will then 
process the request based on its specific procedures and may contact the requester for 
more information.   
 FOIA requests do not require specific forms but form letters are available from 
various sources.  The requests may be submitted electronically, through the postal 
system, or by fax.  Many agencies may require additional forms such as privacy 
agreements.   
4.3 Request Timeframe 
 Agency must make a definitive response to FOIA requests within twenty business 
days (FOIA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i)).   Saturdays, Sundays, and federal holidays 
are not included in this timeframe (FOIA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i)).  Agencies are 
allowed ten additional business days in the event of unusual circumstances (FOIA, 5 
U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(6)(B)(i)).  In the event that the request is too complex to process in 
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thirty business days the agency may ask that the request be reduced in scope or otherwise 
compromised (FOIA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(6)(B)(ii)). 
 FOIA provides for possible expedited processing “in cases which the person 
requesting the records demonstrates a compelling need” (FOIA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 
552(a)(6)(E)(i)(I)).  Each individual agency will determine specific situations in which to 
expedite processing.  The Department of Justice, for example, allows for expedited 
processing in three situations: 1) standard processing time could “reasonably be expected 
to pose an imminent threat to the life or physical safety of an individual,” 2) “if the 
requester is a ‘person primarily engaged in disseminating information,’ by demonstrating 
that an ‘urgency to inform the public concerning actual or alleged Federal Government 
activity’ exists,” or 3) in a situation that the agency deems appropriate (Department of 
Justice, 2010, p. 66-67). 
4.4 Freedom of Information Act Fees 
 Fees may be charged to three types of requesters: commercial use, educational 
use, and general use (FOIA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(I)).  Commercial users may be 
charged for records searches, processing, and duplication (FOIA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 
552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(I)).  Educational users, including the news media, may be charged for 
duplication after the first one hundred pages (FOIA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II)).  
General users are charged fees for searches, after the first two hours, and for duplication, 
after the first one hundred pages (FOIA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iv)(I)).  Fees may be 
waived upon request if the request can be shown to be in the public interest (FOIA, 5 
U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(A)(i)).   
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4.5 Agency Responses 
 Agencies respond to requests via a written determination either fully or partially 
disclosing the requested information, denying the request in full, or citing one of the nine 
FOIA exemptions as cause for a full or partial denial (FOIA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(6)(F)).  
Disclosed information may also be redacted, or edited to conceal information by removal 
or blacking out.   
4.6 Appeals Process  
 If requesters disagree with the agency’s response to disclose information, award 
expedited processing, deny the existence of a record, or deny a fee waiver, they may file 
an administrative appeal with the head of the agency in question (FOIA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 
552(a)(6)(A)(i)).  The agency will make a determination on the appeal within twenty 
business days (FOIA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(6)(A)(ii)).  Appeal requirements will vary 
depending on agency procedures.  The Department of Justice requires the submissions of 
appeals within sixty days while the U.S. Copyright Office requires appeals within thirty 
days (Department of Justice, 2010; U.S. Copyright Office, 2010). 
 Following the denial of an administrative appeal a requester may apply for 
judicial review of the agency’s determination in federal district court (FOIA, 5 U.S.C.A. 
§ 552(a)(4)(B)).  In order for a court to have proper federal jurisdiction over a FOIA case 
the complaint must attest that the agency had “(1) improperly, (2) withheld, (3) agency 
records” (Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 1980, p. 137-38).  
The federal district court will review various causes of action including the existence of 
records or the applicability of FOIA exemptions.  In addition, if the district court 
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determines that the withholding was invalid, attorney’s fees may be awarded (FOIA, 5 
U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(F)(i)).  If the district court holds that “agency personnel acted 
arbitrarily or capriciously with respect to the withholding,” disciplinary action may be 
warranted (FOIA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(f)(i)).    
Chapter 5: National Security Exemptions 
 While all nine FOIA exemptions may be applicable to national security 
information, Exemption 1 specifically addresses national security information and 
Exemption 3 is often applied based on national security specific Executive Orders.   
5.1 Exemption 1 
 Exemptions 1 covers records that are “(A) specifically authorized under criteria 
established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or 
foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.” 
(FOIA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(1)(A)-(B)).  While any Executive Order may be applicable 
each President generally issues an EO specific to the classification of national security 
information.  The current Executive Order, EO 13526, is discussed below.  While the rule 
for which Executive Order is currently controlling varies per jurisdiction, the general 
consensus is to apply the Executive Order “in force when the agency finally acts” (Powell 
v. U.S. Department of Justice, 1984, p. 1516).   
 In order to claim Exemption 1 when defending an appeal of a FOIA denial, an 
agency must provide the court with “detailed and specific information demonstrating 
"that material withheld is logically within the domain of the exemption claimed” 
(Campbell v. Department of Justice, 1998, p. 30).  If such information is provided the 
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court will "accord substantial weight to an agency's affidavit concerning the details of the 
classified status of the disputed record" (Military Audit Project v. Casey, 1981, p. 738). 
5.2 Exemption 3  
 Exemption 3 covers records that are “(3) specifically exempted from disclosure 
by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires 
that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on 
the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types 
of matters to be withheld” (FOIA, 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3)).  In 1975 the Supreme Court 
interpreted Exemption 3 as allowing Congress to enact statutes specifically intended to 
withhold information (Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration v. Robertson, 
1975).  This broad discretion was narrowed the following year with the addition of the 
two requirements listed in Exemption 3.  In addition, through the OPEN FOIA Act of 
2009, statutes must specify whether they are claiming exemption under FOIA b (3), as 
opposed to later being interpreted in a way that claims the exemption (OPEN FOIA Act, 
5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(3)(B)). 
Chapter 6: Executive Orders 
 Executive Orders are issued by the President loosely based on Article II, Section 
1, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution stating, “the executive Power shall be vested in a 
President of the United States of America.”  Executive Orders clarify a pre-existing law, 
as opposed to creating new law, may be issued on nearly any subject matter (Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 1952).   
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6.1 Executive Order 13526: Classified National Security 
Information 
 Beginning with former President Reagan’s Executive Order 12356, a number of 
presidents have issued orders defining the classification policy and procedures for their 
presidency.  President Reagan’s EO 12065 was carried through unchanged until President 
Clinton’s replacement with EO 12958 and then later President George W. Bush’s 
changes in EO 13292.  President Obama followed in suit in issuing EO 13526, which 
went into effect in June 2010 and revoked EO 13292.  EO 13526’s purpose is a balance 
between “protecting information critical to our Nation’s security and demonstrating our 
commitment to open Government” (Executive Order 13526, 2009, p. 707). 
 One step toward finding this balance between the protection of national security 
and supporting open government lies in EO 13526’s most dramatic change.  EO 13526 
established the National Declassification Center (“NDC”), which began operations in 
January 2010 (Executive Order 13526, 2009, Sec. 3.7(a)).  The NDC was established in 
the National Archives and Records Administration to “streamline declassification 
processes, facilitate quality-assurance measures, and implement standardized training 
regarding the declassification of record” (Executive Order 13526, 2009, Sec. 3.7(a)). 
 In order to further the protection of national security, EO 13526 defines the 
procedures for classification of government information.  While EO 13526 makes 
advancements by placing processing restrictions on sensitive information and requiring a 
timeline for the declassification of information a side-by-side comparison yields few 
substantial changes from EO 13292 (Executive Order 13526, 2009, Sec. 1.5).  While the 
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bulk of the text is identical to previous Executive Orders key differences do exist that 
have the potential to make an impact on standing FOIA litigation. 
 Due to the recent implementation of President Obama’s EO 13526 little scholarly, 
political, or legal analysis has been conducted.  In order to determine how past court 
rulings might be altered due to changes from EO 13526, a detailed comparison of the 
President Obama’s Executive Orders 13526 and President Bush’s Executive Order 13292 
must be undertaken, as well as an analysis of past court rulings based on past Executive 
Orders.   
6.2 Differences between Executive Order 13526 and Executive 
Order 13292 
 One of the primary differences between EO 13526 and EO 13292 is apparent 
from the introductory paragraph.  EO 13526 stresses the role of classification of national 
security information in open government.  EO 13292 placed priority only on “protecting 
information critical to our Nation’s security” (Executive Order 13292, 2003, p. 15315).  
EO 13526 includes an additional priority of “demonstrating our commitment to open 
Government through accurate and accountable application of classification standards and 
routine, secure, and effective declassification” (Executive Order 13526, 2009, p. 707).  In 
addition, EO 13526 includes the need to encourage the “free flow of information both 
within the Government and to the America people,” while EO 13292 failed to include the 
context of the flow of information (Executive Order 13526, 2009, p. 707).  While this 
addition does not result in a substantive change to classification procedure it directs 
government policy.   
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6.2.1 Part 1 – Original Classification Section 1.1. Classification Standards 
 The priority of open government continues into the substantive aspects of EO 
13526.  In addressing the classification standards for original classification EO 13526 
includes a provision for how to proceed in the case of doubt over classification.  Section 
1.1(b) states, “if there is significant doubt about the need to classify information, it shall 
not be classified” ((Executive Order 13526, 2009, Sec. 1.1(b)).  This provision lacks 
teeth, however, as it does not “(1) amplify or modify the substantive criteria or 
procedures for classification; or (2) create any substantive or procedural rights subject to 
judicial review” (Executive Order 13526, 2009, Sec. 1.1(b)(1) & (2)).  Without any 
course of action available to a party, this provision merely supports the policy and intent 
behind the Executive Order.   
 In determining the classification levels of national security information EO 13526 
included an additional provision requiring that if the classifying official has “significant 
doubt about the appropriate level of classification, it shall be classified at the lower level” 
(Executive Order 13526, 2009, Sec. 1.2(c)).  While the previous provision outlines the 
limitations to courses of action for litigants, this provision has no such qualifiers.  It is 
unlikely, however, that this provision could be utilized outside the agency as the 
information in question would be classified regardless, even if at a lower level.  This 
addition would likely only have application for inter- or intra-agency reviews. 
6.2.2 Part 1 – Classification Standards Section 1.3. Classification Authority 
 EO 13526’s alterations to the classification training provisions of EO 13292 are in 
keeping with the overall policy of openness.  EO 13526 includes additional requirements 
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for training, at least once per year, on “proper classification (including the avoidance of 
over-classification) and declassification” (Executive Order 13526, 2009, Sec. 1.3(d)).  
EO 13292 merely requires training in “original classification” (Executive Order 13292, 
2003, Sec. 1.3(d)).  In addition, EO 13526 includes provisions for revoking classification 
authority for those who fail to receive such training (Executive Order 13526, 2009, Sec. 
1.3(d)).  While this provision will likely lead to more effective classification and 
declassification it is unlikely to provide an effective course for litigants as the 
repercussions are generally handled by the agency. 
6.2.3 Part 1 – Classification Standards Section 1.4. Classification Categories 
 Section 1.4 contains very important provisions as it sets the standards for which 
categories of information may be classified under the ruling Executive Order.  EO 13526 
makes few changes to the categories of classification yet includes additions supporting 
the general policy of openness, stating, “information shall not be considered for 
classification unless its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause 
identifiable or describable damage to the national security in accordance with Section 1.2 
of this order” (Executive Order 13526, 2009, Sec. 1.4).  The implementing directive for 
EO 13526 states “there is no requirement, at the time of the decision, for the original 
classification authority to prepare a written description of such damage” (Executive 
Order 13526 Implementing Directive, 2009, p. 37255).  This decision, however, must be 
supportable “in writing, including identifying or describing the damage, should the 
classification decision become the subject of a challenge or access demand” (Executive 
Order 13526 Implementing Directive, 2009, p. 37255).      
 25 
 The inclusion of the requirement for classifying officials to weigh the harm of 
disclosure against the inferred reference to the need for the free flow of information 
seems as first glance a token change.  This addition might have drastic consequences to 
FOIA litigation.  Unlike Section 1.1(b), which denies litigants possible causes of action, 
Section 1.4 leaves open the possibility of judicial review and a cause of action.  The 
courts may determine that the weighing of the harm of disclosure or non-disclosure can 
be pursued in the trial itself in evaluating whether the information was properly 
classified.  
6.2.4 Part 1 – Classification Standards Section 1.5. Duration of Classification 
 While retaining the automatic declassification requirement present in EO 13292, 
EO 13526 includes an additional restriction prohibiting the automatic declassification of 
“information that should clearly and demonstrably be expected to reveal the identity of a 
confidential human source or a human intelligence source or key design concepts of 
weapons of mass destruction” (Executive Order 13526, 2009, Sec. 1.5(a)).  While this 
restriction decreases the likely amount of information that may be scheduled for 
automatic declassification, and therefore restricts the free flow of information, the section 
also includes the new requirement that “no information may remain classified 
indefinitely” (Executive Order 13526, 2009, Sec. 1.5(d)).  In addition, EO 13526 includes 
a time limit of twenty-five years on the extension of an original classification (Executive 




6.2.5 Part 1 – Classification Standards Section 1.7. Classification Prohibitions and 
Limitations 
 EO 13292 prohibited the classification of information in order to “(1) conceal 
violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; (2) prevent embarrassment to a 
person, organization, or agency; (3) restrain competition; or (4) prevent or delay the 
release of information that does not require protection in the interest of the national 
security” (Executive Order 13292, 2003, Sec. 1.7(a)).  EO 13526 extended this provision 
stating, “in no case shall information be classified, continues to be maintained as 
classified, or fail to be declassified” in the provided circumstances (Executive Order 
13526, 2009, Sec. 1.7(a)).  While it is unlikely that this provision could be applied as a 
cause of action, it likely will require the release of additional information revealing these 
violations.   
 The reclassification of national security information has long been a point of 
contention in FOIA litigation.  EO 13526 makes substantial changes to EO 13292 
provisions on reclassification beginning with a subtle change in the presentation of 
reclassification.  EO 13292 approached reclassification, stating, “information may be 
reclassified after declassification and release to the public under proper authority only in 
accordance with the following conditions” (Executive Order 13292, 2003, Sec. 1.7(c)).  
EO 13526, on the other hand, restricts reclassification unless the agency meets the four 
conditions discussed below (Executive Order 13526, 2009, Sec. 1.7(c)).  While the 
change is minor it underscores the ongoing policy stated in the introduction.     
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 The conditions for the reclassification of information have also been altered in EO 
13526.  Condition 1 now requires that the approval process is written by the “agency 
head based on document-by-document determination by the agency that reclassification 
is required to prevent significant and demonstrable damage to the national security” 
(Executive Order 13526, 2009, Sec. 1.7(c)(1)).  Previously the reclassification action was 
“taken under the personal authority of the agency head or deputy head, who determines in 
writing that the reclassification of the information is necessary in the interest of the 
national security” (Executive Order 13292, 2003, Sec. 1.7(c)(1)).  While there is no 
definition of a document-by-document determination, the inclusion of some standard of 
review, together with the requirement for “significant and demonstrable damage” places 
the threshold for reclassification somewhat higher than in EO 13292.   
 EO 13526 includes an additional requirement for condition 2 that the information 
to be reclassified must not only be able to be “reasonably recovered” as stated in EO 
13292, but must also be recovered “without bringing undue attention to the information” 
(Executive Order 13526, 2009, Sec. 1.7(c)(2)).  The implementing directive further 
clarifies undue attention as information where “most individual recipients or holders are 
known and can be contacted,” the length of time the information has been available and 
the extent of access is evaluated, and the manner in which the information has been 
disseminated (Executive Order 13526 Implementing Directive, 2009, p. 37257).  A 
number of court cases have focused on whether national security information that has 
been previously disclosed can be reclassified.  The undue attention requirement added to 
EO 13526 may significantly change past court interpretations of this section.   
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 The final two conditions of Section 1.7(c) address oversight of reclassification.  
Condition 3 previously required that reclassification actions are reported to the Director 
of the Information Security Oversight Office while EO 13526 requires that such actions 
also be reported to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (National 
Security Advisor) (Executive Order 13526, 2009, Sec. 1.7(c)(3)).  Condition 4 is an 
entirely new condition prohibiting reclassification of information that is already in the 
“physical and legal custody of the National Archives and Records Administration 
(National Archives) that have been available for public use” (Executive Order 13526, 
2009, Sec. 1.7(c)(4)).   
 EO 13526 makes no substantial changes to the reclassification of national security 
information after a FOIA request for previously undisclosed information.  Section 1.7(d) 
maintains the same language in both Executive Orders stating, “information that has not 
previously been disclosed to the public under proper authority may be classified or 
reclassified after an agency has received a request for it under the Freedom of 
Information Act” (Executive Order 13292, 2003, Sec. 1.7(d); Executive Order 13526, 
2009, Sec. 1.7(d)).   
6.2.6 Part 1 – Classification Standards Section 1.9. Fundamental Classification Guidance 
Review 
 EO 13526 includes new requirements for agency review of classification 
guidance.  EO 13526 Section 1.9 outlines the schedule of the periodic reviews, scope of 
the evaluation, and report requirements (Executive Order 13526, 2009, Sec. 1.9).  While 
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there appears to be no use for Section 1.9 in litigation, judicial review is not prohibited by 
the Executive Order.   
6.2.7 Part 3 – Declassification and Downgrading Section 3.3.  Automatic Declassification 
 EO 13526 makes considerable changes to provisions pertaining to automatic 
declassification.  Tolling for automatic declassification started with original classification 
in EO 13292 and now begins with the origin of the record (Executive Order 13526, 2009, 
Sec. 3.3(a)).  Allowances are made, however, for dates of origin that cannot be 
determined in which case the date of original classification will be used instead 
(Executive Order 13526, 2009, Sec. 3.3(a)).  Information may be exempt from automatic 
declassification on certain conditions.  EO 13292 required that the information “could be 
expected to” meet these conditions, while EO 13526 raises the threshold to “should 
clearly and demonstrably be expected to” (Executive Order 13292, 2003, Sec. 3.3(b); 
Executive Order 13526, 2009, Sec. 3.3(b)).  While the threshold is somewhat higher in 
EO 13526 it is unclear until further court interpretation the extent of the change.   
 Included in these conditions are a number of changes between the two Executive 
Orders.  Condition 6 now requires that the disclosure of information would “cause serious 
harm to relations between the United States and a foreign government” as opposed to 
“seriously and demonstrably impair relations” (Executive Order 13526, 2009, Sec. 
3.3(b)(6); Executive Order 13292, 2003, Sec. 3.3(b)(6)).  Condition 7 previously required 
that the disclosure of information would “clearly and demonstrably impair the current 
ability of United States Government officials to protect the President, Vice President, and 
other protectees” while EO 13526 drops the clearly and demonstrably factor and only 
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requires an impairment of this ability (Executive Order 13292, 2003, Sec. 3.3(b)(7); 
Executive Order 13526, 2009, Sec. 3.3(b)(7)).  Lastly, condition 8 previously required the 
disclosure to “seriously and demonstrably impair current national security emergency 
preparedness plans or reveal current vulnerabilities of systems” (Executive Order 13292, 
2003, Sec. 3.3(b)(8)).  EO 13526 sets the standard at “seriously impair” (Executive Order 
13256, 2009, Sec. 3.3(b)(8)).  While the extent of the impact of these changes depends on 
agency and possibly judicial review, the threshold changes arguably make it easier to 
exempt information from automatic declassification. 
 In addition to a number of procedural changes to automatic declassification, EO 
13526 makes a key change in the time frame of overall automatic declassification.  EO 
13526 requires that “all records exempted from automatic declassification…shall be 
automatically declassified on December 31 of a year that is no more than 50 years from 
the date of origin” (Executive Order 13526, 2009, Sec. 3.3(h)).  Records that reveal “(A) 
the identity of a confidential human source or a human intelligence source; or (B) key 
design concepts of weapons of mass destruction” or in “extraordinary cases” may be 
exempt from the mandatory automatic declassification for an addition twenty-five years 
if the exemptions can be proven “clearly and demonstrably” (Executive Order 13526, 
2009, Sec. 3.3(h)(1)).   
6.2.7 Part 3 – Declassification and Downgrading Section 3.7.  National Declassification 
Center 
 In addition to the declassification database established in EO 13292, EO 13526 
creates a National Declassification Center designated to “streamline declassification 
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processes, facilitate quality-assurance measures, and implement standardized training 
regarding the declassification of records determined to have permanent historical value” 
(Executive Order 13526, 2009, Sec. 3.7(a)).  While the establishment of the National 
Declassification Center is unlikely to have any impact on FOIA litigation it highlights the 
continued influence of the policy for openness established in the introduction.  In 
addition, the National Declassification Center provides an additional avenue for access to 
information should FOIA requests and appeals fail.   
6.2.8 Part 5 – Implementation and Review Section 5.3.  Interagency Security 
Classification Appeals Panel 
 A significant change made in EO 13526 regards the Interagency Security 
Classification Appeals Panel.  The panel makes determinations pertaining to “appeals by 
persons who have filed classification challenges,” “agency exemptions from automatic 
declassification,” and “requests for mandatory declassification review” (Executive Order 
13526, 2009, Sec. 5.3(b)).  Previously the Director of Central Intelligence had authority 
to “object to its conclusion because he has determined that the information could 
reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security” (Executive Order 
13292, 2003, Sec. 5.3(f)).  This veto power applied only to “information owed or 
controlled by the Director of Central Intelligence” (Executive Order 13292, 2003, Sec. 
5.3(f)).  This power was fully revoked in EO 13526 and replaced with the right of an 
agency head to “appeal a decision of the Panel to the President through the National 
Security Advisor” (Executive Order 13526, 2009, Sec. 5.3(f)).   
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Chapter 7: Legal Status of the Freedom of Information Act 
 FOIA established the procedural requirements of the request and disclosure of 
government information and Executive Orders determining the specifics of non-
disclosure.  This next section will describe the judicial process that FOIA requests go 
through and then analyze some of the major court cases in which the procedures from 
both FOIA and Executive Orders have been applied.   
7.1 Standard of Review 
7.1.1 Courts of Appeals 
 Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia, First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, and 
Eighth Circuits1 apply a de novo standard of review in appeals of FOIA cases.  A “court's 
nondeferential review of an administrative decision, through a review of the 
administrative record plus any additional evidence the parties present” (Garner, 2004).  
The de novo standard in FOIA national security cases was explained in Ray v. Turner.  
The court must follow the following guidelines in making a “de novo determination” and 
“the judge would accord substantial weight to detailed agency affidavit” (Ray v. Turner, 
1978, p. 1194).   
                                                
1 The standard of review has been supported recently by the following cases in their jurisdiction.  
Consumers’ Checkbook v. HHS, 554 F.3d 1046, 1049-50 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  Carpenter v. DOJ, 470 F. 3d 
434, 437 (1st Cir. 2006).  Assoc. Press v. DOD, 554 F. 3d 274, 283 (2d Cir. 2009).  Abrams v. Dep’t of 
Treasury, 243 F. App’x 4, 5 (5th Cir. 2007).  Joseph W. Diemert, Jr. & Assoc. Co. v. FAA, 218 F. App’s 
479, 481 (6th Cir. 2007).  Mo. Coal. For the Env’t Found. V. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 542 F. 3d. 1204, 
1209 (8th Cir. 2008).  Abdelfattah v. DHS, 488 F. 3d 178, 182 (3rd Cir. 2007).  Enviro Tech Int’l, Inc. v. 
EPA, 371 F. 3d 370, 373-74 (7th Cir. 2004).  Rein v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 553 F.3d 252, 258 
(4th Cir. 2009).  Pac. Fisheries, Inc. V. United States, 539 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Circ. 2008).  Trentadue v. 
Integrity Comm., 501 F. 3d 1215, 1226 (10th Cir. 2007).  Office of the Capital Collateral Counsel v. DOJ, 
331 F. 3d 799, 802 (11th Cir. 2003).  (Department of Justice Guide to the Freedom of Information Act, 
Litigation Considerations, 827-828) 
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 The Courts of Appeals for the Third and Seventh Circuits apply “two-tiered 
analysis” that evaluates whether the district court had an “adequate factual basis for its 
decision and, if so, whether that decision is clearly erroneous” (Department of Justice, 
2009, p. 829).   
 The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits 
“distinguish between the district court’s factual basis for its decision, which is reviewed 
under a clearly erroneous standard” and the evaluation of the FOIA exemption which is 
review de novo (Department of Justice, 2009, p. 830).   
7.1.2. In camera Review 
 An in camera review occurs when the court will evaluate information either in 
private chambers or “with all spectators excluded” (Garner, 2004).  In camera review is 
allowed by FOIA and is heavily utilized in national security cases where describing the 
information sought publicly would “compromise the secret nature of the information” 
(Vaughn v. Rosen, 1973, p. 826).  Agencies will generally provide as much information 
as possible in public affidavits: “an agency should be given the opportunity, by means of 
detailed affidavits or oral testimony, to establish to the satisfaction of the District Court 
that the documents sought fall clearly beyond the range of material that would be 
available to a private party in litigation with the agency” (Environmental Protection 
Agency v. Mink, 1973, p. 93).  The Supreme Court stated, “plainly in some situations, in 
camera inspection will be necessary and appropriate” (Environmental Protection Agency, 
1973).  The Supreme Court stresses the importance of proper evaluation of the need for 
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an in camera review, but an in camera review “need not be automatic” (Environmental 
Protection Agency, 1973). 
 The in camera review of the records may be conducted by either representative 
sampling or random sampling.  Representative sampling occurs when “documents are 
selected that are ‘representative’ of those being withheld and submitted to the court for in 
camera review” (Dickstein Shapiro LLP v. Department of Defense, 2010, p. 3).  Random 
sampling is when the government selects “every tenth document at issue to deliver to the 
court” (Dickstein Shapiro LLP, 2010). 
 As recently as August 2010, courts have upheld the validity of in camera 
inspections.  In Dickstein Shapiro LLP, an appeal of a denial of a FOIA request for 
information pertaining to Guantanamo detainees, the court determined that an in camera 
review was necessary “in order to determine whether government met its burden of 
demonstrating that documents or information contained therein fell within claimed 
exemptions under FOIA” (Dickstein Shapiro LLP, 2010).  “Ultimately, an agency's 
justification for invoking a FOIA exemption is sufficient if it appears ‘logical’ or 
‘plausible.’” (Wolf v. Central Intelligence Agency, 2007, p. 374-75). 
7.2 Methods of Interpretation 
7.2.1 Glomar response 
 The Glomar Explorer, a ship built in 1973 and first owned by Howard Hughes, 
was secretly used by the CIA in Project JENNIFER involving the retrieval of sunken 
Russian ballistic missile submarines (Glomar Explorer, 2005).  When FOIA requests for 
information pertaining to the ship were first submitted the CIA claimed that they could 
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“neither confirm nor deny the existence of material related to the project,” citing 
Exemptions 1 and 3 (Glomar Explorer, 2005).  This response has since been dubbed the 
Glomar response after the ship (Glomar Explorer, 2005). 
 The Glomar response, a refusal to confirm or deny the existence of information, is 
generally applied in national security FOIA cases due to the statutory exemption to 
“protect intelligence sources and methods” (Hunt v. Central Intelligence Agency, 1992, 
p. 1120).  The Glomar response has generally been upheld by the courts where “to 
confirm or deny the existence of records ... would cause harm cognizable under an FOIA 
exception” (Gardels v. Central Intelligence Agency, 1982, p. 1103).  In order to verify the 
proper application of the Glomar response the court will “perform an ad hoc balancing of 
privacy and public interest implicated by disclosure of any responsive material” (Nation 
Magazine, Washington Bureau v. U.S. Customs Service, 1995, p. 888).   
 The Glomar response has been denied in certain circumstances.  The Glomar 
response was ruled inadmissible in El Badrawi v. Department of Homeland Security 
because the Department of Homeland Security did “not provide sufficiently detailed and 
specific information as to why the information would hinder the ability to obtain such 
information in the future or why such secrecy is allowed by the terms of the executive 
order” and “it does not allow the court to engage in a de novo review of the propriety of 
the withholding” (El Badrawi v. Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 314).   
 In addition, in the American Civil Liberties Union’s appeal of a FOIA denial from 
the Department of Defense for various information, including photographs of prisoner 
abuse at Abu Ghraib prison and the torture memos, the District Court felt that “the 
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purpose of the CIA’s Glomar responses is less to protect intelligence activities, sources or 
methods than to conceal possible “violations of law” in the treatment of prisoners, or 
“inefficiency” or “embarrassment” of the CIA” (American Civil Liberties Union v. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2006, p. 26).  Therefore the District Court ruled that they 
were “not given enough relevant information to make the de novo determinations that 
FOIA would seem to require” (American Civil Liberties Union, 2006) ruling that they 
Glomar response was invalid for certain documents. 
7.2.2 Doctrine of Segregability 
 The doctrine of segregability refers to FOIA 552(b), which states, “any 
reasonably segregable portion of the record shall be provided to any person requesting 
such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt” (FOIA, 5 U.S.C. 552(b)).  
The doctrine holds that “non-exempt portions of a document must be disclosed unless 
they are inextricably intertwined with exempt portions” (Mead Data Central, Inc. v. U.S. 
Department of Air Force, 1977, p. 260).  The court must first make a ruling on the 
applicability of the doctrine of segregability prior to ruling on the application of the FOIA 
exemption (Summers v. Department of Justice, 1998). 
7.2.3 Mosaic or Compilation Theory 
 The mosaic theory is a concept of intelligence gathering in which “disparate items 
of information, though individually of limited or no utility to their possessor, can take on 
added significance when combined with other items of information”  (Pozen, 2005, p. 
630).  In the scope of FOIA litigation the mosaic theory is an argument posed by the 
defendant agency supporting the nondisclosure of information that, coupled with other 
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disclosed information, would pose a threat to national security.  The mosaic theory is 
generally used to deny a FOIA request and has been used substantially more often post-
9/11 (Pozen, 2005, p. 630-631).   
 Mosaic theory initially came into use for FOIA litigation in Halkin v. Helms.  
Halkin stems from a request by Vietnam War protesters for National Security Agency 
(NSA) information and draws from the initial mosaic theory case, United States v. 
Marchetii (Halkin v. Helms, 1978).  The court in Halkin “tried to ascertain the mosaic-
based risks of disclosure before finding for the government” (Pozen, 2005, p. 640).  
Halkin was followed by Halperin v. CIA, a D.C. Circuit Court case reviewing FOIA 
nondisclosure relating to business agreements and legal fees (Halperin v. Central 
Intelligence Agency, 1980).  The circuit court accepted the application of the mosaic 
theory without determining how the requested information could be combined with 
“other small leads” and results in harm to national security (Pozen, 2005, p. 641).   
7.3 Other Considerations 
7.3.1 Vaughn Index 
 The Vaughn Index is a supporting document for the agency’s affidavit, which 
results in an itemized index “correlating each withheld document (or portion) with a 
specific FOIA exemption and the relevant part of the agency’s nondisclosure 
justification” (Department of Justice, 2009, p. 775; Vaughn v. Rosen, 1973).  The index 
allows the court to make a decision on whether the information in question was properly 
classified.  It also allowed the court to become more familiar with the information in 
question without evaluating the actual records.  The index must be “sufficiently detailed” 
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and failure to meet this standard may result in the court requiring an in camera inspection 
or ruling in favor of the requestor (Vaughn v. Rosen, 1973, p. 27).  While no strict 
requirements exists for “sufficiently detailed,” some courts have provided examples of 
what information would meet this standard: “such an index provides the date, source, 
recipient, subject matter and nature of each document in sufficient detail to permit the 
requiring party to argue effectively against the claimed exemptions and for the court to 
assess to applicability of the claimed exemptions” (St. Andrews Park, Inc v. U.S. 
Department of Army Corp of Engineers, 2003, p. 1272).  The Vaughn Index is helpful in 
addressing various issues in FOIA litigation including, but not limited to, the segregation, 
redaction, reclassification, and the Glomar response.   
7.3.2 Adequacy of Search 
 In FOIA litigation the agencies must show, if contested, that they preformed an 
adequate search of the information they possess for the information requested.  The 
agency must show a “good-faith effort to conduct a search for the requested records, 
using methods which can be reasonably expected to produce the information” (Oglesby 
v. U.S. Department of the Army, 1990, p. 68).  The adequacy of the search is proven in 
agency affidavits, which are relied upon by the court when they are “relatively detailed 
and nonconclusory” (Morely v. Central Intelligence Agency, 2007, p. 1116).  These 
affidavits will show the “types of files that an agency maintains, states the search terms 
that were employed to search though the files selected for the search, and contains an 
averment that all files reasonably expected to contain the requested records were, in fact, 
searched” (Department of Justice, 2009, p. 759). 
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Chapter 8: Court Cases 
 The follow are major cases in Freedom of Information legislation grouped by 
major topics pertaining to the national security exemptions.  All of the following cases 
were decided prior to the enactment of Executive Order 13526.   
8.1 Proper Classification 
 Prior to evaluating additional claims in FOIA cases the court must determine if 
the records in question were properly classified pursuant to the prevailing Executive 
Order.  The following cases have addressed different aspects of proper classification and 
comprised the general framework courts may use to rule on this issue. 
 In determining if there was proper classification the agency will submit affidavits 
to the court supporting the classification.  First the court will determine if the procedures 
for classification established in the prevailing Executive Order were followed.  In doing 
so the court evaluates affidavits submitted by the agency.  American Jewish Congress v. 
Department of Treasury presented a FOIA Exemption 1 case in which the court had to 
evaluate if the requested information was properly classified.  After determining that the 
procedures established by the agency for classification have been followed the courts 
"need not go further to test the expertise of the agency, or to question its veracity when 
nothing appears to raise the issue of good faith" (American Jewish Congress, 1982, p. 
1276).  In addition to evaluating that the classification itself was proper and that no bad 
faith existed, the agency affidavits show that the search for the request information was 
proper and adequate (Shaw v. U.S. Department of State, 1983). 
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 The affidavit provided by the agency must be “from an individual with classifying 
authority” (Wickwire Gavin, PC v. Defense Intelligence Agency, 2004, p. 600).  The 
affidavit must also, “provide “detailed and specific” information demonstrating both why 
the material has been kept secret and why such secrecy is allowed by the terms of an 
existing executive order” (American Civil Liberties Union v. Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2006, p. 187).  In evaluating the agency affidavit the court also presumes 
agency expertise in the matter (Bevis v. Department of State, 1983).   
 Other issues in proper classification include classification by foreign 
governments.  The courts have held that classification by foreign governments is proper 
as long as it is allowed by the controlling Executive Order (Southam News v. U.S. 
Immigration & Naturalization Service, 1987).  The Executive Order in question in 
Southam was EO 12356 which states, “foreign government information shall either retain 
its original classification or be assigned a United States classification that shall ensure a 
degree of protection at least equivalent to that required by the entity that furnished the 
information” (Executive Order 12356, 1982, Sec. 1.5(d)).  In addition, EO 12356 
“specifically provides that the release of foreign government information in presumed to 
cause damage to national security” (Southam News, 1987, p. 885).   
8.2 Reclassification 
 Reclassification, when an agency classifies a record that has either been 
declassified or classified at a different level, is an important issue in FOIA national 
security exemption cases.  The issue of reclassification hinges on the ruling authority, 
currently Executive Order 13526.  Declassification also brings with it difficulties with 
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prior disclosure cases, which are further discussed above.  The following cases address 
various issues that arise in reclassification cases.   
8.2.1 Goldberg v. U.S. Department of State 
 Goldberg stems from a FOIA request for responses from U.S. ambassadors to a 
Department of State unclassified questionnaire addressing “host government diplomatic 
practices and reciprocity” (Goldberg v. U.S. Department of State, 1987, p. 74).  Claiming 
Exemption 1 to FOIA, the Department of State withheld a large portion of the requested 
information reclassifying a number of documents after reviewing the information for the 
FOIA request (Goldberg, 1987).   
 At the time of Goldberg’s request Executive Order 12356 was the classification 
authority.  EO 12356, similar to EO 13292, “explicitly allows agencies to make 
classification and reclassification decisions in light of, and at the time of, FOIA requests” 
(Goldberg, 1987, p. 77).  EO 12356 stated “the President or an agency head or official 
designated… may reclassify information previously declassified and disclosed if it is 
determined in writing that (1) the information requires protection in the interest of 
national security; and (2) the information may reasonably be recovered” (Executive 
Order 12356, 2009, Sec. 1.6(A)).  Similarly, EO 13292 stated:  
Information may be reclassified after declassification and release to the 
public under proper authority only in accordance with the following 
conditions: (1) the reclassification action is taken under the personal 
authority of the agency head or deputy agency head, who determines in 
writing that the reclassification of the information is necessary in the 
interest of the national security; (2) the information may be reasonably 
recovered; and (3) the reclassification action is reported promptly to the 
Director of the Information Security Oversight Office  
Executive Order 13292, 2003, Sec. 1.7(c). 
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 Therefore, the court in Goldberg determined that “the only question for this court 
is whether the information withheld under Exemption 1 has been properly 
classified…whether it was once unclassified is immaterial under FOIA” (Goldberg, 1987, 
p. 79).  In addition, the court held that the appellant must bring evidence to “somehow 
undermine or call into question the correctness of the classification status of the withheld 
information, or the agency’s explanation for the classification” as opposed to the validity 
of a reclassification (Goldberg, 1987, p. 81). Based on the applicable Executive Order 
courts in FOIA litigation are not required to make a finding on reclassification of non-
disclosed information and courts are left only with the authority to evaluate whether the 
information was properly classified.   
8.2.2 Branch v. Federal Bureau of Investigation 
 In Branch the plaintiff submitted a FOIA request for information pertaining to 
Stanley Levison from the FBI (Branch v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1988).  The 
FBI responded by partially disclosing the information and claiming FOIA Exemption 1 
and 7 for the remainder of the information (Branch, 1988).  In ruling on the 
reclassification issue the court stated, “Executive Order 12, 356 explicitly allows 
agencies to make classification and reclassification decisions upon receipt of a FOIA 
request” (Branch, 1988, p. 48).  In determining if reclassification was proper, the agency 
“determined that the withheld documents contain information concerning intelligence 
activities, sources, and/or methods” (Branch, 1988, p. 48).  Based on this argument 
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supported by the agency’s affidavit and the courts in camera inspection, the court found 
that the reclassification of the information was proper (Branch, 1988). 
8.3 Prior disclosure of Information 
 Prior disclosure of information may come about in many situations.  Information 
may have been unclassified, declassified, or disclosed without authorization or by a non-
U.S. government body.  The following cases address how the courts have addressed prior 
disclosure of information. 
8.3.1 Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D. C., Inc. v. National Security 
Agency 
 In Scientology the appellant had requested information from the National Security 
Agency for all records “on appellant and the philosophy it espouses, as well as records 
reflecting dissemination of information about appellant to domestic foreign governments” 
and references to L. Ron Hubbard (Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D. 
C., Inc. v. National Security Agency, 1979, p. 825).  The NSA replied to the FOIA 
request by denying possession of any records matching the requests descriptions 
(Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D. C., Inc., 1979).  After showing that 
the NSA did in fact possess such records the NSA “declined to supply more than minimal 
information” (Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D. C., Inc., 1979, p. 826) 
citing FOIA Exemption 3.  The district court held that the records in question were 
properly exempt under FOIA Exemption 3 and moved for summary judgment in favor of 
the defendant (Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D. C., Inc., 1979).   
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 The Court of Appeals found that the district court “failed in this litigation to 
conduct a true de novo review” as the affidavit supplied by the NSA was “far too 
conclusory to support the summary judgment” (Founding Church of Scientology of 
Washington, D. C., Inc., 1979, p. 311).  The NSA had argued that disclosing the 
information would make public “vital national security information concerning the 
organization, function and communication intelligence capabilities of the NSA” 
(Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D. C., Inc., 1979, p. 831).  Without 
more specific supporting details from the agency affidavit, the court could not accept the 
NSA’s position that damage may result from records that “may implicate aspects of the 
agency’s operations already well publicized” and stated “suppression of information of 
that sort would frustrate the pressing policies of the Act without even arguably advancing 
countervailing considerations” (Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D. C., 
Inc., 1979, p. 832).  The case was remanded to the district court (Founding Church of 
Scientology of Washington, D. C., Inc., 1979).   
8.3.2 Afshar v. Department of State 
 In Afshar the appellant, editor of the Iran Free Press and chairman of the 
Committee for Free Iran, had submitted a FOIA request to the Department of State, the 
CIA, and the Department of Justice requesting all records relating to “him or his activities 
on the newspaper of the Committee” (Afshar v. Department of State, 1983, p. 1128).  The 
agencies replied to the FOIA request with partial disclosure of redacted information 
claiming Exemptions 1 and 3 for the remainder of the information (Afshar, 1983).  After 
holding that the records in question were properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 
12356, the district court denied Afshar’s motion for reconsideration stating “the exercise 
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of this authority…is left to the unreviewable discretion of the Executive” (Afshar, 1983, 
p. 1129). 
 On appeal the court evaluated four issues including “whether the Act allows the 
government agencies herein to withhold information under exemptions 1 and 3 where 
there have been prior disclosures of similar information” (Afshar, 1983, p. 1127).  Afshar 
argued that the agencies denial of his FOIA request was improper because “information 
fitting the defendants‘ descriptions of the withheld information has already been released 
to the public” and therefore posed no additional identifiable damage to national security 
(Afshar, 1983, p. 1129).  In addition, Afshar argues that the “government should be 
compelled to show how the withheld information is both different from and more 
sensitive than the information already released” in order for non-disclosure to be proper 
(Afshar, 1983, p. 1130).  The court stated that while initially the government bears the 
burden in FOIA cases “a plaintiff asserting a claim of prior disclosure must bear the 
initial burden of pointing to specific information in the public domain that appears to 
duplicate that being withheld” (Afshar, 1983, p. 1129).   
 Afshar differs from other FOIA prior disclosure cases, as the plaintiff is not 
claiming that the information withheld is the exact information that was previously 
disclosed but is similar to the information previously disclosed.  While the court in 
Afshar acknowledges the difficulty for plaintiffs in prior disclosure FOIA cases to meet 
that burden without a more in-depth knowledge of the information withheld, the court, 
“unless it senses bad faith or a general sloppiness in the declassification or review 
process, a court will feel with special urgency the need to ‘accord substantial weight to an 
agency’s affidavit concerning the details of the classified status of the disputed record’” 
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much like a court’s evaluation of proper classification (Afshar, 1983, p. 1131).  This 
holding was recently supported in Amnesty International USA v. Central Intelligence 
Agency in which the courts ruled on a FOIA Exemption 1 case pertaining to CIA 
enhanced interrogation techniques.  The court stated that regardless of “the fact that the 
government disclosed general information on its interrogation program does not require 
full disclosure of aspects of the program that remain classified” (Amnesty International 
USA v. Central Intelligence Agency, 2010, p. 23).  The court held "the information 
contained in the withheld records are more detailed than the information that already 
exists in the public domain and would seriously damage national security if released" 
(Amnesty International USA, 2010, p. 23).   
8.4 Redaction of Information 
 Redaction is a common technique used by agencies to segregate classified and 
non-classified information in order to meet FOIA requests.  The following cases address 
how the courts have ruled on the redaction of information in FOIA case.   
8.4.1 Larson v. Department of State 
 In Larson the appellants had requested information from the National Security 
Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of State about violence in 
Guatemala in the 1970s and 1980s (Larson v. Department of State, 2009).  The NSA 
responded to the plaintiffs FOIA request with partial disclosure of some of the requested 
records and redacted those disclosed (Larson, 2009).  The NSA claimed Exemptions 1 
and 3 for the non-disclosed information (Larson, 2009).  The district court ruled in favor 
of the NSA’s request for summary judgment holding “FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3 
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protected the withheld materials from disclosure” (Larson, 2009, p. 862).  The Court of 
Appeals held, on the question of whether redaction of information is proper, that the 
agency bears the burden of showing that the exemption applies to the information 
redacted and that “ultimately, an agency's justification for invoking a FOIA exemption is 
sufficient if it appears ‘logical’ or ‘plausible.’” (Gardels v. Central Intelligence Agency, 
1982, p. 1105).  Under FOIA, information may be redacted as long as agencies meet their 
burden.   
8.5 Existence or Non-Existence of Information 
 As discussed above the Glomar response, neither denying nor admitting to the 
existence or non-existence of information, is often used as a response to FOIA requests 
by agencies.  The following cases address how the courts have ruled on the Glomar 
response.   
8.5.1 Hougthon v. National Security Agency 
 Houghton allows a look at a more recent case decided in 2010.  In Houghton the 
appellant requested all information from the National Security Agency (NSA) “in which 
my name is mentioned, including any investigations of me; any interviews of others 
regarding me; any investigations of a group to which I belonged and am mentioned as a 
member; and any records in which my name is mentioned but I was not a direct subject 
of an investigation” (Houghton v. National Security Agency, 2010, p. 236).  The NSA 
determined that the information was exempt from FOIA under Exemptions 1 and 3.  The 
NSA responded to Houghton that they “could neither confirm nor deny whether 
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intelligence records relating to him exist, or whether any specific technique or method 
was employed in those efforts” (Houghton, 2010, p. 237).   
 The third circuit first determined whether the two exemptions were properly 
applied.  The court found that Exemption 1 was properly applied and that the NSA met 
its burden as the information was properly classified under the prevailing Executive 
Order, EO 13292 (Houghton, 2010).  EO. 13292 allows for the classification of 
information that “could be reasonably expected to result in damage to the national 
security” (Executive Order 13292, 2003, Sec. 1.1(a)(4)).  The court stated that the agency 
official “reasonably determined that the information sought by Houghton could reveal 
information about intelligence activities…and, therefore falls within the category of 
classified information” (Houghton v. National Security Agency, 2010, p. 238).  The court 
also determined that the agency properly refused to confirm or deny the existence of the 
information because doing so would also “reveal information that is currently classified 
CONFIDENTIAL pursuant to the Executive Order and would allow individuals to 
accumulate information and draw conclusions about the NSA's technical capabilities” 
(Houghton, 2010, p. 238). 
8.5.2 El Badrawi v. Department of Homeland Security 
 In El Badrawi the plaintiff requested information concerning himself, including 
alternative spellings of his name, from five agencies including the Department of 
Homeland Security (El Badrawi v. Department of Homeland Security, 2008).  The 
defendants moved for summary judgment based on their showing that “it had conducted a 
search reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents” (El Badrawi, 2008, p. 
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298).  The court denied the defendant’s request as they failed to “provide sufficiently 
detailed and specific information as to why the information would hinder the ability to 
obtain such information in the future or why such secrecy is allowed by the terms of the 
executive order” and “it does not allow the court to engage in a de novo review of the 
propriety of the withholding” (El Badrawi, 2008, p. 314).   
 Most recently, in Amnesty International USA v. Central Intelligence Agency 
(2010) the court held that a prior disclosure by a foreign government is not equal to a 
disclosure by a US government agency.  In this case the Yemeni government made an 
official disclosure of the existence of operational cables regarding interrogation 
techniques.  The court held that the Glomar response issued by the CIA was proper, even 
with the Yemeni government’s disclosure, due to the possible harm to national security 
(Amnesty International USA v. Central Intelligence Agency, 2010).     
Chapter 9: Impact of Executive Order 13526 
 The previous cases motioned were all decided prior to Executive Order 13526 
issued by President Obama, which went into effect June 2010.  As mentioned earlier the 
application of EO 13526 may moderately impact the application of FOIA disclosures in 
national security cases.  This section will analyze the impact of EO 13526 on topics 
mentioned above that relate to the national security exemptions.   
9.1 Proper Classification 
 The basic requirements to show information was properly classified under the 
pertinent Executive Order remain the same in EO 13526.  In determining proper 
classification the agency must submit an affidavit attesting to the fact that the information 
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was properly classified, which is generally in the form of a Vaughn Index.  The court will 
give substantial weight to this affidavit.  EO 13526, while including new provisions for 
original classification, does not include any requirements pertaining to the affidavit.  In 
regards to proper classification EO 13526 supports the overall policy of open access by 
encouraging agencies not to classify information if there is “significant doubt” as to the 
propriety of classification, yet denies any new “substantive or procedural rights” 
(Executive Order 13526, 2009, Sec. 1.1(b)(1)).  EO 13526 does leave a cause of action 
available in regards to the level of classification.  Yet, this would not provide an 
alternative route for courts as the information would still be classified, and therefore 
exempt from disclosure, regardless of the changes in EO 13526 (Executive Order 13526, 
2009, Sec. 1.2(c)).  The lack of effective change applies to the other requirements of 
proper classification.  Courts will still accept the expertise of the agency and 
classification by foreign governments as proper classification. 
 There are some possible, if tenuous, avenues for litigants from EO 13526.  The 
addition of the training requirement in Section 1.3(d) might support individuals’ 
arguments that the classification was not proper if they are able to show that the agency 
failed to meet the training requirements of EO 13526.  In addition, failure to meet 
training requirements might indicate bad faith on the part of the agency, which would 
allow the court to further question the affidavit.  If the court recognizes any bad faith on 
the part of the agency, or if the agency fails to provide a “detailed and specific” affidavit, 
the court may evaluate if the agency properly weighed the harm of disclosure against the 
need for disclosure as the agency is now required not to classify information “unless its 
unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expect to cause identifiable or describable 
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damage to the national security” (Executive Order 13526, 2009, Sec. 1.4).  The court may 
require the agency to support this conclusion “in writing, including identifying or 
describing the damage” (Executive Order 13526 Implementing Directive, 2009, p. 
37255).   
 Other areas that the court may evaluate further include whether the agency failed 
to meet other requirements, such as failing to meet time limits on classification 
(Executive Order 13526, 2009, 1.5(c)), improperly indefinitely classifying information 
(Executive Order 13526, 2009, Sec. 1.5(d)), or not “clearly and demonstrably” 
demonstrating threats to national security as a waiver to automatically declassified 
information (Executive Order 13526, 2009, Sec. 1.5(a)).  EO 13526 also allows for 
review of mandatory review of classification guidance (Executive Order 13526, 2009, 
Sec. 1.9) and automatic declassification (Executive Order 13526, 2009, Sec. 3.3).  In 
addition, EO 13526 now restricts agencies from continuing to classify information to 
“conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error” or to prevent 
embarrassment (Executive Order 13526, 2009, Sec. 1.7(a)).  While this provision was 
previously available the continued classification or failure to declassify is now an 
additional cause of action. 
  The court may make use of an in camera to evaluate these claims. These avenues 
to contest proper classification will be available only in extreme cases.  Currently there 
are internal checks to ensure agencies meet these requirements and the chance of an 
outside individual gaining proof of such violations is slim.  These are, however, new 
possibilities for individuals denied access and courts seeking to evaluate agency actions 
in properly classifying national security information. 
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9.2 Reclassification 
 Much like in proper classification many of the new causes of action for 
reclassification are well hidden from the public.  The new requirement for agency heads 
to approve reclassification in writing is unlikely to be violated, yet if it is violated 
individuals are unlikely to discover the violation until discovery (Executive Order 13526, 
2009, Sec. 1.7(c)).  The most significant change to reclassification, the requirement that 
information may not be reclassified “without bringing undue attention to the information” 
may make a profound impact on FOIA litigation (Executive Order 13526, 2009, Sec. 
1.7(c)(2)).  Future litigation on the meaning of “undue attention” is necessary in order to 
have a thorough understanding of the impact of this change, though the implementing 
directive sheds some light on the meaning.   
 In Goldberg, the court only evaluated “whether the information withheld under 
Exemption 1 has been properly classified” not whether recovering the information would 
bring undue attention (Goldberg v. U.S. Department of State, 1987, p. 79).  While the 
exact details of Goldberg that would impact this new issue are unknown, as the court did 
not find it a question at issue, in reevaluating the case the court would look at the number 
of people who have the information, the extent of the information they possess, and the 
way the information was disclosed (Executive Order 13526 Implementing Directive, 
2009, p. 37257).  The court in Branch came to a similar conclusion.  The court held that 
the question was not whether reclassification was appropriate, as the Executive Order 
explicitly allows for reclassification, but whether the classification was proper (Branch v. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1988).  In a case with the right set of facts it is likely that 
this change in EO 13526 would alter the courts holding in reclassification cases.  In such 
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a case these requirements for reclassification, coupled with new possible causes of action 
in the issue of proper classification, are likely to yield an entirely different result.  
Unfortunately, very few cases have addressed the issue of reclassification. 
 Executive Order 13526 makes no changes that would impact the agencies right to 
reclassify information at the time of a FOIA request and conditions 3 and 4 of Section 
1.7(c) are unlikely to provide any additional support for litigants as they apply to internal 
procedures.  These additional procedures do, however, support the overall policy for open 
information.    
9.3 Prior Disclosure of Information, Redaction of Information, 
and the Glomar Response 
 Aside from the possible causes of action now available under proper classification 
there are no apparent changes to litigation pertaining to the majority of prior disclosure, 
redaction, or Glomar response cases.  In fact, to address many of the issues at hand in 
these cases the courts defer to the agency affidavit.   
 In prior disclosure cases the court will evaluate the agency affidavit in 
determining whether the information that was previously disclosed duplicates the 
information now being withheld and, even in the case of prior disclosure of duplicate 
information, whether making the information public would disclose “vital national 
security information” (Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D. C., Inc. v. 
National Security Agency, 1979, p. 831). 
 Similarly, redaction of information and the Glomar response are still acceptable 
under EO 13526.  Courts will still evaluate, based on the agency affidavit, whether “an 
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agency’s justification for invoking a FOIA exemption is sufficient if it appears ‘logical’ 
or ‘plausible’” (Wolf v. Central Intelligence Agency, 2007, p. 374-75).  In redaction and 
Glomar response cases the courts also address if the doctrine of segregability and the 
mosaic theory were properly applied.  This evaluation also rests on the agency affidavit 
and the determination of proper classification. 
 While the new avenues described under proper classification are available in these 
cases additional changes would have to be made to EO 13526 in order to strengthen the 
courts scope of review in national security FOIA cases.  These recommendations are 
detailed below.    
Chapter 10: Recommendations 
 Executive Order 13526 takes many opportunities to support the policy of open 
access through the policy statements throughout the EO and actions such as the 
establishment of the National Center for Declassification.  While these changes are likely 
to result in more disclosure of government information through FOIA from the start of 
the request process, EO 13526 makes little impact on FOIA national security litigation.  
EO 13526 makes few changes that would strongly effect the results of past national 
security FOIA exemption cases.  The new causes of action provided by EO 13526 are at 
most tenuous and questionable.  In order for the policy stated in EO 13526 to influence 
substantial and practical results there are number of recommendations should be 
implemented.   The implementation of these changes in the current climate may encounter 
difficulties.  Due to the concerns with homeland security, such as the implications of the 
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Patriot Act, and leaks of classified information to sources such as WikiLeaks agencies are 
slower to implement procedural changes.   
10.1 Changes to Future Executive Order 
 Future Executive Orders should implement textual changes in order to make the 
supported policy procedure.  First, the Executive Order should include a substantive and 
procedural right for information that was classified with “significant doubt about the need 
to classify” (Executive Order 13526, 2009, Sec. 1.1(b)).  Second, the publication of 
agency review of classification guidance and training should be included in Section 1.9 
requiring that the agency publicly publish details showing the agency has met these 
requirements.  Third, identifying information should be publicly published for records 
that are automatically, or otherwise, declassified.   
 Lastly, the Executive Order needs to include a standardization of government 
affidavits pertaining to classification of information.  While EO 13526 makes progress on 
the standardization of classification of government information, the affidavits provided to 
the courts by agencies in FOIA cases do not mirror this standardization.  Future 
Executive Orders need to establish a standard for agency affidavits as current court held 
requirements for the Vaughn index are not adequate to meet the needs of the courts and 
litigants and may not apply to every jurisdiction.  Standardization would supply both the 
courts and the litigants with a more thorough understanding of the reasons and 
procedures for classification.  This understanding would allow for a more accurate ruling 
in FOIA cases. 
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 Improving the agency affidavits will also improve court holdings on other issues 
including prior disclosure of information, redaction of information, and the Glomar 
response.  In addition to improvements to affidavits future Executive Orders or other 
litigation may address concerns with these issues.  While the redaction of information is 
appropriate in circumstances where the agency proves the need for classification, refusal 
to disclose information that was previously disclosed requires additional action.  These 
actions should include increased communication between agencies and governments 
when information is accidentally, or purposefully, disclosed when classified.  Agencies 
must also ensure the standardization of markings on classified and controlled unclassified 
information.  Lastly, the courts must rule on the application of new definitions for 
“bringing undue attention to the information” and the supporting implementing 
information (Executive Order 13526, 2009, Sec. 1.7(C)(2); Executive Order 13526 
Implementing Directive, 2009, p. 37257).   
 Lastly, future actions should include specific requirements for information that 
may entail the Glomar response.  These requirements may include agency head approval, 
a higher threshold to apply the response to the information in question, and the inclusion 
of what information pertaining to the records may be released in the event that the courts 
do not accept the Glomar response. 
10.2 Procedure and Review Transparency 
 A significant hurdle for individuals filing FOIA appeals is the lack of information 
about how FOIA procedures have been followed inside the agency and the results of 
agency review processes.  Without access to this information litigants are unable to prove 
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essential aspects of their case, are unaware of possible causes of action, and courts are 
unable to properly evaluate agency affidavits.  Future Executive Orders should increase 
transparency of this information to the courts and litigants.  
 This information might include records schedules, agency head authorizations, 
training, and review schedules.  While it is possible that this information might be 
protected by the national security exemptions, or other FOIA exemptions, the Executive 
Order should place the burden on the agency for verifying the application of these 
exemptions.  By establishing the presumption of individual access to this information, 
litigants have more support for their claims that information was not properly classified 
or that agencies failed to follow the Executive Order’s procedures.   
 In addition to aiding litigants and the courts in preparing for and evaluating 
agency affidavits procedure and review transparency will also benefit the agency itself 
and other Federal agencies.  A better understanding of the successes and failures of 
agency procedures will allow all agencies to properly evaluate their own procedures.  
This will result in better-formulated procedures and encourage a critical eye in review 
processes.   
Chapter 11: Conclusion 
  Regardless of the reluctance of President Johnson to sign the Freedom of 
Information Act it was enacted with support from the roots of the United States.  FOIA 
fortified the principles of freedom of information that had been a part of U.S. policy since 
the Declaration of Independence (Relyea, 2009a).  FOIA was enacted in order to provide 
individuals with “broad disclosure of Government records” giving U.S. citizens the tools 
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needed to actively and effectively participate in their democracy (Department of Justice 
v. Julian, 1988, p. 8).   
After 9/11, freedom of information in the U.S. moved backward resulting in 
barriers to access to government information (Jaeger & Bertot, 2010).  FOIA’s original 
objectives were to balance the protection of classified information against the need for 
public disclosure, especially in regards to national security information (Floor 
consideration of S. 1160, 1965, p. 26821).  This policy has been hindered by past 
Executive Orders, which shifted the balance in favor of protection of government 
information (Jaeger & Bertot, 2010).  President Obama intended to remove the barriers 
and shift policy towards freedom of information with the assistance of Executive Order 
13526 on Classified National Security Information (White House, 2009, p. 1).   
The true effect of EO 13526 is yet unknown as past court cases were based on 
past Executive Orders.  In identifying the differences between President Bush’s EO 
13292 and President Obama’s EO 13526 distinctions in policy and the procedure could 
be pinpointed.  The implications to FOIA national security exemption litigation, however, 
requires applying these changes to past court holdings on important issues.  Based on 
these comparisons and the application of the changes to FOIA national security 
exemption cases, EO 13526 fails to effectually support freedom of information in 
litigation.   
Textual changes between Executive Order 13292 and 13526 are significant yet 
are restricted to general policy and some internal agency procedure.  Changes and support 
of policy are important as they demonstrate the mindset of the administration when 
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addressing related issues.  In addition, changes to internal agency policy may have 
significant impact.  Internal agency policy may result in a decrease to over-classification, 
an increase of declassification, an increase in information disclosed through FOIA 
requests, and a possible decrease in the number of FOIA request that result in litigation.  
These changes, however significant an impact on freedom of information, fail to change 
the outcome of significant FOIA national security exemption litigation and current 
precedent.  
This failure has left a void between the policy supported by EO 13526 and the 
actual effect of the order on FOIA national security exemption litigation.  Additional 
changes are needed in order to close this void.  In order to make an actual impact with 
freedom of information policy additional actions are needed.  These include making 
textual changes to the ruling Executive Order that support the disclosure of information, 
providing additional information on agency actions for plaintiffs and courts, and giving 
courts greater scope of judicial review in FOIA cases.  In addition, freedom of 
information should include access to internal agency procedure and review to ensure 
compliance with FOIA and Executive Order provisions.  In doing so the policy supported 
throughout Executive Order 13526 would be an effectual policy as opposed to verbal 
vagueness.   
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Appendix A: Freedom of Information Act 
http://www.archives.gov/about/laws/foia.html  
 
Appendix B: Executive Order 13292 
http://www.archives.gov/isoo/policy-documents/eo-12958-amendment.pdf  
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